From Limited War to Limited Victory: Clausewitz and Allied Strategy in Afghanistan
Résumé
The United States and its allies entered Afghanistan with nearly unlimited war aims,
but with the intention of only using limited force. This strategic error undermined the intervention
and made success difficult or impossible. Through an examination of Clausewitzian
thought about popular war, limited war and the culminating point of victory, this article
shows the enduring value of Clausewitzian concepts in contemporary conflicts against nonstate
actors. These concepts are tested in three cases – the involvement of the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France in Afghanistan – to examine the relationship between their
war aims, resource commitments, and war outcome. Of the three, France deployed relatively
the most forces to Afghanistan, but the allied engagement remained insufficient to overcome
the insurgency. Lacking sufficient mass, the limited forces were insufficient to establish the
strategic superiority necessary to achieve nearly unlimited goals. This was compounded by a
failure to concentrate against the insurgents crossing the border from Pakistan. In the
absence of a clear political determination to reconcile means and ends, the culminating
point of victory passed in 2006. It is not the intention here to recommend that contemporary
military deployments follow Clausewitzian ideas to the letter; that is not what Clausewitz
intended. It is clear, however, that NATO allies in Afghanistan failed to be stronger than the
enemy where it was necessary, even when the insurgent groups were diffuse and only
loosely unified.